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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM ON THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL
PETER A. DONOVAN*
I. INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Society has at last awakened to the consequences of the increas-
ing degradation of man's environment. The media have publicized the
imminent shortage of potable water and food supplies, the sudden
accretion of toxic wastes in the air, the presence of dangerous metals
such as mercury in the food chain, the increasingly rapid deterioration
of the inner cities, the psychological and physiological harm which
results from constant noise assault and population density, the grow-
ing stockpile of deadly radioactive wastes, the pollution of soil with
pesticides and herbicides, and the peril of thermal imbalance. An
aroused scientific community also has warned society of the impend-
ing dangers, and many interested scientists have begun to study and
document the deleterious effects of non-circumspect technology upon
the environment. These developments, which have filtered down into
the understanding of the average citizen, portray the scope of en-
vironmental pollution as a national, and, indeed, an international or
transnational problem.
Any attempt to rectify existing environmental abuses and to
achieve and maintain environmental quality, therefore, must neces-
sarily be at least national in scope. This is axiomatic even though
Congress has declared that the primary responsibility for environ-
mental quality rests with state and local governments. While all levels
of government must coordinate their activities in achieving the col-
lective goal, federal example must undoubtedly supply the impetus
behind any meaningful national achievement.
During the year 1970, the national fight against pollution enlisted
new and potentially powerful weapons. These ranged from the enact-
ment of the most important administrative statute ever passed by
Congress, through subsequent congressional legislation and executive
reorganization of the federal bureaucracy, to initially successful steps
in modifying and adapting the federal antitrust laws to comport with
environmental protection. Of particular significance are the adminis-
trative reforms.
On this administrative level, the first environmental development
during the year 1970 was the formal enactment of the National En-
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
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vironmental Policy Act of 1969, which was signed into law by the
President on January 1, 1970. This Act declared the dual federal
objective of restoring and maintaining environmental quality. The
Act created in the Executive Office of the President a new institution,
the Council on Environmental Quality, to assist and advise the Presi-
dent in connection with environmental programs and the purposes
and policies of the Act.
Congress quickly followed with the passage of the Environmental
Quality Improvement Act of 1970, which established the Office of
Environmental Quality, also within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, to provide a professional and administrative staff in support of
the Council. Next came executive reorganization of the federal bureau-
cracy to streamline procedures and responsibilities. Many conflicting
and, in some instances, even contradictory duties and policies pre-
viously imposed upon several agencies of the federal government were
eliminated. The reorganization plans also created two new agencies.
One of these, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is a "super-
agency" to which has been transferred authority over most federal
environmental protection programs. These reorganization plans be-
came effective on October 3, 1970.
This article surveys these developments at the administrative
level. Particular emphasis is given to the discussion of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 since this statute may justifiably
be said to be the fountainhead for federal activity in the area of the
environment.
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) became effective.' This Act is the most important ad-
ministrative statute ever passed by Congress in the area of environ-
mental protection. The Act contains a congressional declaration of
national environmental policy and imposes both substantive and pro-
cedural duties on all federal officials and agencies to implement its
policy. In summary, the stated purposes of the act are
No declare a national policy which will encourage produc-
tive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of
the ecological systems and natural resources important to
1 42 U.S.C. 4.321 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
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to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental
Quality. 2
Because of its importance and overriding influence on all federal ac-
tivities, NEPA requires careful consideration and analysis.
A. Purposes and Policies
It should be noted initially that NEPA declares the national en-
vironmental policy in broad, sweeping language. Section 101(a), for
example, recognizes the "critical importance of restoring and main-
taining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development
of man," and then "declares that it is the continuing policy of the
Federal Government to use all practical means and measures . . . in
a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in protective harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans." 5
Section 101(b) 4 carries this thought forward by providing that
"[l]n order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all prac-
tical means, consistent with other essential considerations of national
policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs,
and resources" toward certain stated ends.5
 These goals are detailed
in the statute as follows:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee
of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environ-
ment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other
undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects
of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an
environment which supports diversity and variety of indi-
vidual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing
of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and ap-
2
 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (Supp. V, 1970).
42 U.S.C. 1 4331(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
42 U.S.C. 4331(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
5 42 U.S.C. § 4332(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
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proach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable re-
sources .°
Section 101(c) contains the further important declaration that
"[t] he Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful
environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute
to the preservation and enhancement of the environment." 7 With ref-
erence to this section and the provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act,' one commentator has suggested that "a private citizen .. .
should have standing to challenge actions and decisions of federal
agencies allegedly in violation of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, where the action or decision threatens to have adverse
effects on the ecosystem in which he resides or in the ecosystem that
he uses for recreation."' Although this construction of the Act seems
desirable, it is not entirely clear that this position is supported by the
legislative history. A change which occurred during the legislative
process leading to the enactment of the provision appearing as sec-
tion 101(c) should be noted.
NEPA itself is a synthesis of two bills introduced into the Senate
and House, respectively (S. 1075 and H.R. 6750). Originally, the
Senate version provided that "[t] he Congress recognizes that each
person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environ-
ment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of the environment."'" This language
should be compared with the present version which now provides that
"each person should enjoy a healthful environment." According to
the House managers of the bill, the change was made "because of
doubt on the part of the House conferees with respect to the legal
scope of the original Senate provision." 1 ' Apparently, the conferees
feared that S. 1075 might result in the issuance of injunctions against
federal agency action which in any manner violated a citizen's "funda-
mental and inalienable right to a healthful environment."
Some consideration should be given to the words "fundamental
and inalienable right." Language of this type is generally used to
describe constitutional rights enjoyed by citizens. It is unclear whether
the Senate bill employed the term in this sense. If this is what S. 1075
intended, the question arises whether Congress can articulate con-
stitutional rights by legislative pronouncement. It is generally assumed
42 U.S.C. 4331(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
7 42 U.S.C. 1 4331(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
8 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. (1964).
9 Yannacone, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 1 Environ. Law 8, 31
(1970).
79 S. 1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
11 Cong. Rep. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
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that the judiciary alone is competent to interpret the Constitution.
Quite the contrary, however, is true. Congress is a proper body for
constitutional interpretation and its standing in this regard is not
affected by the assumed power of the Supreme Court of finality in
declaring constitutional interpretations.
It is emphasized that the national policy enunciated in NEPA
was designed to ensure that federal action does not contribute to en-
vironmental problems. Section 101(a), therefore, recognizes "the pro-
found impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components
of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of
population growth, high density urbanization, industrial expansion,
resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological ad-
vances . . . . "12 The report of the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, which held hearings on the bill, provides a more
specific description of the types of problems that NEPA was designed
to solve:
Examples of the rising public concern over the manner in
which Federal policies and activities have contributed to
environmental decay and degradation may be seen in the
Santa Barbara oil well blowout; the current controversy over
the lack of an assured water supply and the impact of a
super-jet airport on the Everglades National Park; the pro-
liferation of pesticides and other chemicals; the indiscrimi-
nate siting of steam fired power-plants and other units of
heavy industry; the pollution of the Nation's rivers, bays,
lakes, and estuaries; the loss of publicly owned seashores,
open spaces, and other irreplaceable natural assets to in-
dustry, commercial users and developers; rising levels of
air pollution; federally sponsored or aided construction ac-
tivities such as highways, airports, and other public work
projects which proceed without reference to the desires and
aspirations of local people.
S. 1075 is designed to deal with many of the basic causes of
these increasingly troublesome and often critical problems
of domestic policy.
*	 *	 *
S. 1075 is also designed to deal with the long-range implica-
tions of many of the critical environmental problems which
have caused great public concern in recent years. 18
12 42 U.S.C: 4 4331(a) (Stipp. V, 1970).
13 -5. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
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To attain these objectives, the national environmental policy set
forth in NEPA focuses on both "restoring and maintaining environ-
mental quality," in Section 101(a), and further emphasizes, in Sec-
tion 2, its introductory general policy section, that one of the purposes
of the Act is "to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate dam-
age to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man ....s14 This dual focus on prevention and elimination
of environmental damage is supported by other provisions of the Act
which impose substantive and procedural duties on federal officials
to implement the national environmental policy by rectifying past
instances of environmental abuse as well as by preventing future
abuse.
The substantive duties are set forth in Sections 102 and 103 of
the Act and require separate consideration. For purposes of analysis
and comprehension, it is also important to distinguish the procedural
duties which are also largely set forth in the same two sections. Ac-
cordingly, both types of duties are separately treated, as is the
language of the statutory provisions themselves in the following three
subsections of this article.
B. Substantive Duties Under the Act
The most important provision of the Act, and the one most de-
bated in Congress, appears in Section 102(1) which contains the
following provision:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of
the United States shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter. . . .15
The significance and impact of this provision depend upon the inter-
pretation accorded the clause, "to the fullest extent possible," which
modifies all section 102 duties. It seems clear both from the language
of the Act" and its legislative history that the modifying clause was
14 42 U.S.C. 14321 (Supp. V, 1970).
15 42 U.S.C. 4 4332(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
10 The language of	 102, particularly the italicized words (as they appear here)
immediately following the modifying phrase, should be emphasized and carefully noted:
"(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all
agencies of the Federal Government shall [comply with the action forcing procedures set
forth in subparagraphs (A) through (H)]." This language should be compared and con-
trasted with that of 411 101(b) which iinposes a duty on federal officials and agencies
which appears to be discretionary because of specific qualifying language: ". . . it is the
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practical means, con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate
federal plans, functions, programs and resources. . . ." The determination of "practical
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intended to make the duties mandatory, not discretionary." The
legislative history concerning the purpose of the modifying phrase is
summarized in the Conference Report on the substitute bill which
was enacted:
The conference substitute provides that the phrase "to the
fullest extent" possible tin section 1021 applies with respect
to those actions which Congress authorizes and directs to be
done under both clauses (1) and (2) of section 102 (in the
Senate Bill, the phrase applied only to the directive in clause
(1)). In accepting this change to section 102 (and also to
the provisions of section 103), the House conferees agreed
to delete section 9 of the House amendment from the con-
ference substitute. Section 9 of the House amendment pro-
vided that "nothing in this Act shall increase, decrease or
change any responsibility or authority of any Federal official
or agency created by other provision of law." In receding
from this House provision in favor of the less restrictive pro-
vision "to the fullest extent possible" the House conferees
are of the view that the new language does not in any way
limit the congressional authorization and directive to all
agencies of the Federal Government set out in subparagraphs
(A) through (H) of clause (2) of section 102 .... The pur-
pose of the new language is to make it clear that each agency
of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives
set out in such subparagraphs (A) through (H) unless the
existing law applicable to such agency's operations expressly
prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives
means" and "consistency" with "other essential considerations of national policy" appears
to be left to the decision maker, and thus the § 101(b) duty seems to be discretionary.
Section 102 duties, however, are non-discretionary. Under the language of the section, it
seems clear that federal judges and officials have no choice or discretion but are obligated
to "Interpret" and "administer" the policies, regulations and public laws of the United
States in accordance with the policy set forth in NEPA "to the fullest extent possible."
There is no reference to "practical means" of achieving the goals nor recognition of
"other essential considerations" in I 102. See Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 E.L.R. 50035, 50037 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Peterson].
17 Several statements to this effect appear in the legislative history:
A statement of national policy for the environment—like other major policy
declarations—is in large measure concerned with principle rather than detail;
with an expression of broad national goals rather than narrow and specific
procedures for implementation. But if goals and principles are to be effective,
they must be capable of being applied in action. 5.1075 thus incorporates certain
action-forcing provisions and procedures which are designed to assure that all
Federal agencies plan and work toward meeting the challenge of a better en-
vironment.
S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). See also 115 Cong. Res. S19009-013
(1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
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impossible. If such is found to be the case, then compliance
with the particular directive is not immediately required.
However, as to other activities of that agency, compliance is
required. Thus, it is the intent of the conferees that the pro-
vision "to the fullest extent possible" shall not be used by
any Federal agency as a means of avoiding compliance with
the directives set out in section 102. Rather, the language in
section 102 is intended to assure that all agencies of the Fed-
eral Government shall comply with the directives set out in
said section "to the fullest extent possible" under their stat-
utory authorizations and that no agency shall utilize an
excessively narrow construction of its existing statutory au-
thorization to avoid compliance."
It seems clear throughout the legislative history of the Act that
the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" was inserted to require that
agencies implement the national environmental policy unless precluded
from doing so by statute." Thus, if implementation of NEPA policy
is possible, the agency must comply with the Section 102 duty. Where
full implementation of the policy is impossible because a portion of it
is precluded by statute, the agency is excused from full implementa-
tion. However, it still has the responsibility to comply insofar as pos-
sible .20
It is only when an agency determines that it is precluded by the
statute governing its jurisdiction and activities from implementing the
national environmental policy, in whole or in part, that it is excused
from complying with the section 102 duties.' In this event, however,
section 103 requires the agency to "propose to the President, not later
than July 1, 1971, such measures as may be necessary to bring their
authority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes, and
procedures set forth in this chapter." Detailed examination of the
provisions of section 103 is deferred to the next subsection of this
article. However, one salient point will be noted. Senator Henry Jack-
son, sponsor of NEPA and Chairman of the Senate Interior and In-
sular Affairs Committee, observed:
What is involved is a congressional declaration that we do
not intend, as a government or as a people, to initiate ac-
18 Cong. Rep. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1969).
19 115 Cong. Rec. H12635 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1969); 115 Cong. Rec. 517453 (daily
ed. Dec. 20, 1969) (major changes in S. 1075 as passed by the Senate); Representative
Aspinwall's dissent from this otherwise unanimous interpretation appears to be without
foundation. 115 Cong. Rec. H13094 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 1969) (remarks of Rep. Aspin-
wall).
20 Id.
21 See Peterson, supra note 16, at 50037.
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tions which endanger the continued existence or the health
of mankind: That we will not intentionally initiate actions
which will do irreparable damage to the air, land, and water
which support life on earth. 22
The duties imposed by section 102 apply to a broad range of action.
All federal officials and agencies, 23 including independent regulatory
commissions,24
 with the exception of environmental protection agen-
cies," must comply. Thus, all decisions and actions which affect the
environment, including those supported by federal contracts, grants,
subsidies, loans, and other forms of funding assistance, as well as those
which involve federal leases, licenses or permits, must comply with the
national environmental policy except to the extent compliance is pre-
cluded by statute."
Perhaps the full impact of this extensive coverage can be seen
most clearly in the way NEPA will affect the operation and decision
making of those federal agencies which have no environmental re-
sponsibility under existing law.
Many older operating agencies of the Federal Government,
for example, do not at present have a mandate within the
body of their enabling laws to allow them to give adequate
attention to environmental values. In other agencies, espe-
cially when the expenditure of funds is involved, an official's
latitude to deviate from narrow policies or "the most econom-
ical alternative" to achieve an environmental goal may be
strictly circumscribed by congressional authorizations which
have overlooked existing or potential environmental prob-
lems or the limitations of agency procedures. There is also
reason for serious concern over the activities of those agen-
cies which do not feel they have sufficient authority to under-
take needed research and action to enhance, preserve, and
22 115 Cong. Rec. S17451 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969).
23 See S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969).
24
 See Hearings on S. 1075 and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116-17, 121.
23 115 Cong. Rec. S17453 (daily ed. Dec, 20, 1969) (major changes in S. 1075 as
passed by the Senate). This legislative intent is also recognized in the "Interim Guide-
lines" of the Council on Environmental Quality, 35 Fed. Reg. 7391 (1970).
20
 Exec. Order No. 11514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970) implies that NEPA is to be
applied to the following federal actions:
(1) Recommendations or reports relating to legislation and appropriations;
(2) Projects in continuing activities directly undertaken by federal agencies, sup-
ported in whole or in part through federal contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other
forms of funding assistance, or involving a federal lease, permit, license certificate or
other entitlement for use;
(3) Policy and procedure making.
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maintain the qualitative side of the environment in connec-
tion with development activities.
S.1075, as reported by the committee, would provide all
agencies and all federal officials with a legislative mandate
and a responsibility to consider the consequences of their ac-
tions on the environment. This would be true of the licensing
functions of independent agencies as well as the ongoing
activities of the regular federal agencies . 27
One of the major purposes and accomplishments of NEPA, as
Senator Henry Jackson has pointed out, is that it "provides a stat-
utory foundation to which administrators may refer . . . for guidance
in making decisions which find environmental values in conflict with
other values."29 Federal officials must thoroughly analyze the impact
of all proposed actions on the environment. Thus, two decisions must
be made. Initially, it must be determined whether the proposed action
will have any significant environmental impact and, subsequently,
whether there exists any conflict with or between environmental values
and other values. In this regard, the procedural "action-forcing" re-
quirements of section 102 (2), especially the provisions of subpara-
graphs (C) and (D), become most important. Both of these provisions
are discussed in detail in the following section.
It seems clear that one of the main purposes of these procedural
"action-forcing" provisions was to establish a restructuring of the
decision-making process and to accomplish a reordering of priorities.
One observer has even suggested that they go so far as to shift the
burden of proof to the proponent of action which would disturb the
environment. 29 The following statement of the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs offers support to this view:
As a result of ... failure to formulate a comprehensive na-
tional policy, environmental decision making largely con-
tinues to proceed as it has in the past. Policy is established
by default and inaction. Environmental problems are only
.dealt with when they reach crisis proportions. Public desires
and aspirations are seldom consulted. Important decisions
concerning the use and the shape of man's future environ-
ment continue to be made in small but steady increments
which perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized mistakes
27 S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 {1969).
28 115 Cong. Rec. S17451 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969). See also 115 Cong. Rec. 519009
(daily ed. July 10, 1969).
29 See Peterson, supra note 16, at .50040, citing Hanks, An Environmental Bill of
Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 Rutgers
L. Rev. 230 (1970).
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of previous decades. Today it is clear that we cannot con-
tinue on this course."
The provisions analyzed here, if enthusiastically accepted and
implemented by federal officials, could have far-reaching national and
transnational consequences. Not only could conservation values be-
come accepted for their own merit, but the history of industrialized,
developed societies in depleting the irreplaceable resources of their own
and other countries at an alarming rate might be reversed. Unfor-
tunately, as the recent interim report issued by the Department of the
Interior on the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline controversy indicates, this
reversal does not appear to be the necessarily emerging result. The
opposition of the newly created Environmental Protection Agency to
this interim position, however, suggests that proposed federal action
must have a strong base when it becomes inconsistent with the national
environmental policy. Moreover, NEPA has not been entirely ineffec-
tive in obtaining favorable judicial interpretation.
C. Procedural Duties Under the Act
Briefly stated, all agencies of the federal government are required
by section 102 (2), "to include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
effecting (sic) the quality of the human environment, a detailed state-
ment" on certain specified environmental considerations. Prior to mak-
ing the detailed statement, the responsible federal official is required to
consult and obtain the comments of any federal agency which has juris-
diction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental
impact involved. In full, section 102(2) contains the following provi-
sions:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible: . . . (2) all agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment shall—
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and
social sciences and the environmental design arts in plan-
ning and in decision making which may have an impact on
man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures,
in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality
established by subchapter II of this Chapter, which will
insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities
and values may be given appropriate consideration in de-
80 S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).
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cision making along with economic and technical consid-
erations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed ac-
tion,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which can-
not be avoided should the proposal be imple-
mented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses
of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources which would be involved
in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible
Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments
of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact
involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and
views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies,
which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards, shall be made available to the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as
provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany
the proposal through the existing agency review processes;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alter-
natives to recommended courses of action in any proposal
which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative
uses of available resources;
(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range charac-
ter of environmental problems and, where consistent with
the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate
support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed
to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and
preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world en-
vironment;
(F) make available to States, counties,' municipali-
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ties, institutions, and individuals, advice and information
useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality
of the environment;
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the
planning and development of resource-oriented projects;
and
(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality es-
tablished by subchapter II of this chapter.
The overlap and interrelationship between these procedural "action-
forcing" provisions and the substantive duties discussed above is at
once apparent. While each of the subparagraph provisions is impor-
tant, detailed attention is given here only to subparagraphs (C), (D)
and (F) because of their particular potential for reordering priorities.
Section 102(2) (C) requires that a "detailed statement" be pre-
pared by the agency whenever "legislative proposals" or "other major
Federal action" is involved. This proVision does not seem intended to
imply that the environmental impact of agency action may be ignored
in other instances. The stated policies of sections 2 and 101, and the
duty imposed by section 102(1), require that adverse environmental
impact be considered even where section 102 (2) (C) statements are
not required. Otherwise federal agencies and officials could not attain
the Act's dual objectives of "restoring and maintaining environmental
quality"3  by rectifying past instances of environmental abuse as well
as by preventing future abuse. 32
Subparagraphs (C) (iii) and (D) of section 102 (2) become par-
ticularly important where adverse environmental effects will result
from proposed action, and also where it is possible to restore environ-
mental quality previously lost. Under these provisions, the federal
agency or official must consider alternatives to the proposed action.
Under section 102 (2) (D), federal agencies and officials have the re-
sponsibility to "study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives
to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves un-
resolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources."
This language suggests that the consideration of alternatives must
be as thorough as the consideration of environmental impact. If an
environmentally harmless alternative exists, it must be adopted in-
stead of the original proposal. Where the proposal has no alternative
compatible with the national environmental policy, the legislative his-
tory suggests that federal officials and agencies have the responsibility
to reassess the justification for the proposed action. Particularly per-
tinent to this point is Senator Jackson's statement that environmentally
81 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
82 See Peterson, supra note 16, at 50038.
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destructive activity be permitted infrequently: "This basic principle of
the policy is that we must strive in all that we do, to achieve a standard
of excellence in man's relationships to his physical surroundings. If
there are to be departures from this standard of excellence, they should
be exceptions to the rule and the policy. And, as exceptions, they will
have to be justified in the light of public scrutiny as required by sec-
tion 102."" As one commentator has stated:
Even if an agency succeeds in proving that an environ-
mentally destructive action is justified, its responsibility does
not end. The agency must then take all possible steps to min-
imize the adverse effects of its action. This conclusion flows
from the application of the national environmental policy to
all of the subordinate decisions after the initial decision is
made. A consideration of alternative techniques of imple-
menting the decision is especially important at this stage of
the decision-making process."
The provisions of subparagraph (F) and the second part of sub-
paragraph (C) of section 102(2) are particularly relevant to state
environmental action. These two provisions would give state govern-
ments and their agencies, private institutions and citizens access to
federal agency records which are relevant to the protection of the
environment as well as to the statements required to be filed by sec-
tion 102(2) (C). The impact of subparagraphs (C) and (F) in this
regard is quite important since the benefits of the duties imposed
upon the federal government by the remaining provisions of subpara-
graphs (A) through (H) of section 102 (2) are made available to all
environmentally concerned parties. At the present time, the Council
on Environmental Quality, created by Title II of NEPA, has adopted
the position of not making the environmental impact statements of
other federal agencies public until it has prepared and submitted its
own comment on the statements. As a practical matter, this means
that parties not consulted by the EPA under subparagraph (C), do
not have a chance to participate in the agency's evaluation or influence
its decision.
The Council's position in declining to make the environmental
impact statements available until it has prepared and submitted its
own comment is based upon the absence of explicit time provisions
for making the data available under the Freedom of Information Act."
Its position in distinguishing between environmental impact statements
83 115 Cong. Rec. 517451 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969); see also 115 Cong. Rec. S7815
(daily ed. July 10, 1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
34 Peterson, supra note 16, at 50040.
35 5 U.S.C. 55 (1964).
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which are "drafts" and those which are "final," has generated strong
criticism 89
 As the Environmental Law Institute has stated:
[T]he Council is free to guarantee early public access to
"detailed" 102 (2) (C) statements. In light of this Presiden-
tial directive [Executive Order 11514] it seems anomalous
that the public should now be last in the hierarchy of consul-
tation behind federal, state and local agencies, especially
when the way is open under the act to put the public on an
equal footing with them. (Also, when read literally NEPA
requires that the President, the Council and the public be
given contemporaneous access to the statements.)"
Prior to the passage of NEPA, planning and decision making of
the federal government and private industry was all too frequently
"the exclusive province of the engineer and cost analyst's These
people often ignored environmental factors because of the difficulty
in evaluating them quantitatively in the same equation with the eco-
nomic and technical factors motivating proposed action." NEPA now
requires that federal agencies and officials strive to develop the meth-
odology and techniques necessary for determining the value and im-
portance of environmental factors. This can be seen in the various
other subparagraphs of section 102(2). Subparagraph (A), for exam-
ple, specifically states that federal agencies are to "utilize a systematic
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the
natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts," and
subparagraph (B) imposes upon them the further duty to "identify
and develop methods and procedures ... which will insure that pres-
ently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic
and technical considerations." The further duty to "initiate and utilize
ecological information in the planning and development of resource-
oriented projects" is imposed by subparagraph (G). Finally, NEPA
recognizes that the duty to rectify ecological abuse and maintain en-
vironmental quality must be viewed in its proper international or
transnational perspective. The provisions of subparagraph (E) require
federal agencies and officials to "lend appropriate support to initia-
tives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international
cooperation" whenever cooperation is consistent with the foreign policy
of the United States.
These procedural requirements are particularly important to con-
88 1 E.L.R. 10005-007 (1971).
87 Id. at 10007.
88
 S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969).
89 id.
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servationists and environmentalists. They are now assured that the
necessary energy of government will be devoted to the development
of heretofore unknown data bearing upon their concerns. They have
won their initial victory, and NEPA now provides that full investiga-
tion and consideration must be accorded ecological factors, along with
economic and technological factors, in order to fulfill the country's
responsibility to succeeding generations to maintain and enhance en-
vironmental quality. Regrettably, much of these data may not be made
available to concerned public and private institutions and individuals
because of the Council's position in distinguishing between draft and
final statements which it conceivably might apply to the other ecolog-
ical data collected and prepared by federal agencies.
D. Agency Review of Existing Operations
The final provision of the National Environmental . Policy Act of
1969 which is important to the present analysis is contained in Sec-
tion 103. This section provides that all agencies of the federal govern-
ment shall review their present statutory authority, administrative
regulations, current policies and procedures to determine whether any
deficiencies or inconsistencies exist which prohibit full compliance with
the national environmental policy. Prior to July 1, 1971, these agencies
are to propose to the President measures necessary to bring their au-
thority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes and
procedures set forth in NEPA. In its interim guidelines, the Council of
Environmental Quality advanced this date to September 1, 1970, and
these statements have been prepared by all principal agencies and have
been publicly disclosed."
As noted above, the question arises as to the relationship between
Sections 103 and 102 of the Act, particularly in light of the clear state-
ment in Section 105 41 that the Act is supplemental and does not repeal
existing legislation. In response to these inquiries, it is necessary to
underscore one fact. Section 103 is not intended to provide federal
agencies and officials with an escape from the duties imposed by sec-
tion 102. It was emphasized during the debates on the Conference
compromise bill that the provisions of section 102 "direct any Federal
agency which takes action that it must take into account environmental
management and environmental quality considerations.' 42 The section
was "designed to assure consideration of environmental matters by all
agencies in their planning and decision making—especially those agen-
40 Copies may be obtained from the Environmental Law Institute.
41 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (Supp. V, Z970).
42 115 Cong. Rec. 517451 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
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cies who now have little or no legislative authority to take environ-
mental considerations into account."'"
From the Conference Committee Report, it appears that section
103 is to have application only when there is "a clear conflict between
[an agency's] existing statutory authority" and NEPA." Although
federal agencies are not to construe their present statutory authority
in an "unduly narrow manner," it is also clear that they are not to
construe their statutory authority in a manner which will avoid full
compliance with the Act. Thus, section 103 has application, and federal
agencies are to recommend changes under it, only when a provision
of their enabling statutes "clearly precludes full compliance with the
act."" The text of the statements which have been filed does not
appear to present as many inconsistencies and deficiencies between
NEPA objectives and the goal of other federal legislation as some had
anticipated."
E. Case Law Under the Act
It is now only a little over a year from the effective date of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The paucity of cases deal-
ing with NEPA has left unanswered many questions which only judi-
cial interpretation can ultimately resolve. Three of these questions are
of sufficient importance to the prospective impact of the Act to warrant
raising them here: (1) whether judicial review is precluded under
NEPA or whether the duties imposed by the Act are legally cogniz-
able; (2) what plaintiffs or classes of plaintiffs have standing to en-
force the Act's provisions; and (3) whether the Act was intended to
be, or will be, applied retrospectively.
1. Judicial Review Under NEPA
The question whether a plaintiff has standing under a statute to
assert his claim should be distinguished from the question whether
Congress intended to preclude judicial review of administrative find-
ings under that statute. The general rule as to the latter question is
that judicial review is not precluded absent a clear manifestation of
congressional intent to do so. Since no such express intent is mani-
fested in NEPA, this initial issue would seem settled. Moreover, as
the ensuing discussion illustrates, no case which has relied upon NEPA
as the basis of a cause of action has yet been dismissed on the ground
that judicial review was precluded by the statute itself.
43 Id. at 17453.
44 Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969).
43 Id.
40 This is the position of the Environmental Law Institute. See 1 E.L.R. 10008.
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However, there remains the other more difficult threshold ques-
tion whether NEPA creates any legally cognizable duties. Since Sec-
tion 102(1) states expressly that "the policies, regulations, and public
laws of the United States shall be interpreted in accordance with the
policies set forth [in NEPA] to the fullest extent possible," this second
question would also seem to be resolved. Nevertheless, at least one
court has indicated that NEPA was not intended to create any legally
cognizable rights or duties. In Bucklein v. Volpe," the court stated:
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the Environmental
Policy Act can serve as the basis for a cause of action. Aside
from establishing the Council, the Act is simply a declaration
of Congressional policy; as such it would seem not to create
any rights or impose any duties of which a court can take
cognizance. There is only this general command to federal
officials to use all practicable means to enhance the environ-
ment."
With all due deference to the Bucklein court, it is submitted that this
interpretation ignores the legislative history of NEPA and, in partic-
ular, the Section 102 (1) requirement that all "public laws" of the
United States, as well as "policies and regulations," be "interpreted
and administered" in accordance with the national environmental pol-
icy "to the fullest extent possible" unless precluded by statute from
doing so. (Emphasis added.)" In the final analysis, this mandate
would seem to be enforceable only by courts whose duty it is to inter-
pret the law.
Although it also contains a rather narrow construction of NEPA,
the decision of the court in Ely v. V elde" stands in contrast to that
of the Bucklein court. In Ely, plaintiffs sought permanently to enjoin
the building of a medical center for Virginia prisoners in a "uniquely
historic" rural area of the state where plaintiffs resided. Part of the
cost of the center was to be paid by the federal government under the
Safe Streets Act." In approving the grant of moneys under this Act,
the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Association (LEAA) ad-
mittedly did not consider the environmental impact of the proposed
construction on the area. Alleging violations of both the National
Historic Preservation Act" and NEPA, plaintiffs brought suit under
47	 F.
 Supp. —, 2 E.R.C. 1082 (ND. Cal. 1970).
48 Id. at —, 2 E.R.C. at 1083. It should be noted that the quoted statement on the
applicability of NEPA was dictum.
40 See pp. 546-50 supra.
co 321 F. Supp. 1088, 2 E.R.C. 1185 (ED. Va. 1971).
51 42 U.S.C. 6 3701 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
82 16 U.S.C. 1470 et seq. (1964).
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the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act." Although the
court denied plaintiffs the relief requested, it held the case cognizable
both under the National Historic Preservation Act and under NEPA.
The confusion caused the judiciary by the language of section
102(1) is apparent from the decision on the merits in the Ely case.
In denying the injunction, the court based its holding upon the deter-
mination that NEPA is a "discretionary" statute while the Safe Streets
Act was "non-discretionary," and, therefore, the LEAA officials admin-
istering the Safe Streets Act did not have to comply with NEPA." The
court admitted that "the Congress did not intend the clause in [sec-
tion 102] 'to the fullest extent possible' to be an escape provision" but,
nevertheless, concluded that the NEPA obligation to consider environ-
mental impact "is discretionary only."" In reaching its decision, the
court relied upon language in the Safe Streets Act which provided
that "the Administration shall make grants . . . to a state planning
agency if such agency has on file . . . an approved comprehensive state
plan . . . .""
This seems an unduly narrow construction of the Act in face of
the clear congressional intent to accomplish a reordering of national
priorities. As indicated above, this intent is manifested both in the
legislative history and in the language of NEPA. If Congress intended
to create only discretionary directives, why was it so careful to point
out in the several committee reports and in the debates that the phrase
modifying section 102 was not intended to create an escape hatch, and
that "each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the
directives set out in [section 102] unless the existing law applicable to
such agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance
with one of the directives impossible?" (Emphasis added,) 57 Why did
it use the terms "authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible . . . [the] public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
chapter" and that "all agencies of the Federal Government shall"
abide by the provisions of subparagraphs (A) through (H) of sec-
tion 102 (2) ? (Emphasis added.)
It would appear that NEPA contains as much mandatory lan-
guage as the Safe Streets Act. As the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas stated in its opinion in Texas Com-
mittee v. United States: "It is hard to imagine a clearer or stronger
53 S U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1964).
54
 2 E.R.C. at 1187.
55 Id.
5° 42 U.S.C. § 3733 (Supp. V, 1970).
57 See pp. 546-48 supra.
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mandate to the Courts!'" The court's distinction between "discre-
tionary" and "non-discretionary" statutes as applied in the case is
poorly founded."
Apart from this deficiency, it seems clear that the decision in Ely
falls far short of implementing NEPA policy "to the fullest extent pos-
sible." It would have been much more consistent with the spirit and
language of NEPA for the court to have ordered LEAA to consider
the environmental consequences of its action. This position would not
make implementation of the Safe Streets Act objectives impossible,
but would help to make them compatible with other federal policy
objectives. A more preferable interpretation of the two statutes would
have resulted. It would seem that in approving a plan, a federal agency
should be required to consider the matters Congress directed it to
consider in a statute clearly designed to establish a comprehensive
environmental program.
Each of the points made in criticism of the Ely decision seems
particularly well articulated in the following thoughtful extract from
the Texas Committee opinion:
The Congress has expressed in strong and clear language
their concern over what we are doing to our environment. In
the language of the statute, Congress has recognized the
"critical importance of restoring and maintaining environ-
mental quality." In very repetitive language, Congress has
made clear that it intends to "use all practical means and
measures . . . to preserve" the "natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain wherever possible, an environ-
ment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice." Furthermore, the Congress:
authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance
with the policies set forth in this Act. Sec. 102.
It is hard to imagine a clearer or stronger mandate to the
Courts . . . .
It should also be pointed out here that the Congress in
mandatory language requires all federal agencies to under-
take, to the fullest extent possible, measures to insure pro-
tection and preservation of the environment, consistent, of
course, with other economic and social requirements and
goals. . .60
69 - F. Supp. —, 1 E.R. 1303 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
69 See Peterson, supra note 16, at 30037 (1971).
00
 1 E.R. at 1304.
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2. Standing Under NEPA
Because NEPA contains no express standing provisions, the issue
of standing under the Act is largely unresolved, and this article will
not attempt an exhaustive analysis of the problem. Some observations,
however, are appropriate.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Association of Data Pro-
cessing Service Organizations v. Camp" lays down the standing test
for a plaintiff whose complaint is grounded on a federal statute. First,
he must allege that "the challenged action [or inaction] has caused
him injury in fact, economic or otherwise."" Second, he must place
the interest he seeks to protect "arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated, by the statute ... in question." 83
If one adopts the more likely result that judicial review of ad-
ministrative findings is not precluded under NEPA, then the applica-
tion of the Data Processing test would seem to demand the result that
all legitimate representatives of the public have standing to enforce
NEPA in the courts. This result follows from the recently expanded
view" of standing taken by federal courts and from the intent of the
statute itself. First, it now seems accepted that the interest of a public
representative which is injured in fact need not be economic," but
can reflect "aesthetic, conservational and recreational values."°° Sec-
ond, since NEPA is clearly designed to protect the public interest in
environmental quality, that same public interest must necessarily be
"within the zone of interest to be protected" by NEPA. 67 This is the
position adopted in the Ely case where the court held that NEPA was
a relevant statute within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act, and that the plaintiffs, who were residents of the affected area,
were within the class sought to be protected by the Act. The court
held that they satisfied the Data Processing test "not only [because
of] injury to their personal interest, but also, acting as private at-
torneys general, [because of] injury to the public interest"; they were
clearly within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute,
NEPA."
61 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
02 Id. at 152.
as Id. at 153.
54
 Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450 (1970).
65
 See text at note 54 supra, quoting from the Supreme Court opinion in Data
Processing.
66
 See Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 320 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (1965).
07 There would seem to be as much connection between the private citizen and the
NEPA zone of interests as there was between the tenant farmers and the Upland Cotton
Program enacted as part of the Food and Agricultural Act of 1965, 7 U.S.C. $ 144(d)
(Supp. IV, 1969), in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
68
 2 E.R.C. 1188.
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This view that all representatives of the public have standing to
enforce the mandates of NEPA has already been espoused by at least
one commentator" and is undoubtedly the better view." Nevertheless,
it is not alone conclusive of the problems in the area of public repre-
sentation, the foremost of which is the process the courts will ulti-
mately use to determine which persons or groups can justifiably be
said to represent the public interest. 71
Despite the Ely decision, the truly perplexing question of stand-
ing under NEPA exists with respect to the private litigant. The diffi-
culty arises from some interesting considerations. Federal courts have
favored having before them the specific plaintiff or plaintiffs who
directly suffered from the injuries alleged in the complaint. The policy
favoring this approach is that the specific plaintiff or plaintiffs will
present the factual issues in their most concrete and adversary form.'
Where a statute is expressly intended to protect a public interest,
however, opposite policy considerations become operative. Now, it is
impossible to anticipate having specific individuals who have suffered
unique damage. Their injury would be of the same quality as that
suffered by other citizens, though there probably will be differences
in degree. In these cases, therefore, the judicial interest must be to
have before the court a litigant capable, both in resources and so-
phistication, of eliciting facts relevant to large-scale environmental
damage or deterioration. These demands may, in fact, be beyond the
abilities of most private litigants.
Courts Would do well to consider these distinctions when called
upon to resolve the question of standing under NEPA. At the min-
imum, it is certainly arguable that since the statute is silent, a private
party has standing to enforce NEPA's directives, and this is the con-
clusion reached by the court in the Ely case. If the public has sustained
damage in fact to an environmental interest, a fortiori, so has the indi-
vidual, at least an individual residing in or otherwise using the area
affected by the environmentally harmful activity. It is a contradiction
to argue that the damage to the public is more specific than the dam-
age to the individual. If the public is within the zone of interest to be
ea See note S supra.
70 See text at notes 8-11 supra.
71 Cf. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 39 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971). The court denied the
Sierra Club standing to challenge the issuance of a license to build a ski resort. The
Sierra Club did not allege a violation of NEPA. Nevertheless, in finding that the Sierra
Club's (78,000) members did not "possess a sufficient interest for standing to be con-
ferred," the court noted that the United States Ski Association, the Far West Ski
Association (109,000), and the County of Tulare, where the development was to be
located, all favored the issuance of the license. No. 24966 at 6-7.
72 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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protected by NEPA, as the Ely court held, so must be the private
individual. However, while this conclusion is logically required, it does
not automatically folloW that private citizens can always qualify as
public representatives. In this connection, it is interesting to note the
statement of the Ely court that "[t]he plaintiffs, even when acting in
the public interest as private attorneys general, cannot purport to
substitute their standard of public need for that lawfully designated
to [the appropriate state official]. 173
3. Retiospective Application
Probably the most important question concerning NEPA which
remains unresolved is whether the Act will receive retrospective appli-
cation. At the one extreme, if NEPA is held to be fully retroactive, all
federal administrative agency decisions made before January 1, 1970
must be brought into conformity with the Act's directives. At the other
extreme, prospective application alone would mean that all decisions
made prior to NEPA's effective date would stand regardless of their
environmentally destructive effects. A middle ground would see deci-
sions pre-dating the Act essentially remain unaffected, except for ad-
ministrative review on the question of how best to minimize possibly
undesirable consequences.74 Pending resolution by the Supreme Court,
determination of retroactive application remains an open question.
In Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett," the court
was asked to enjoin construction of a road approved by the Secretary
of Transportation which allegedly would affect a trout stream." In
dismissing the request for the injunction, the court considered the issue
of the retroactivity of NEPA:
[The most reasonable interpretation that can be given to
the legislative history of the Act is that there is no manifest
Congressional intention or unequivocal and inflexible impact
in the language used to indicate that the Act should be ap-
plied retroactively. Indeed, if the language of the Act favors
any position, it most likely favors non-retroactivity."
The court cited the language of Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Laramie
Stock Yards Co.," that " 'the first rule of construction is that legisla-
78 Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088, 2 E.R.C. 1185, 1190 (E.D. Va. 1971).
74 Cf. Texas Comm. v. United States, — F. Supp. —, 1. E.R. 1303 (W.D. Tex.
1970).
73 315 F. Supp. 238, 1 E.R. 1271 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
70 The defendants were the Secretary of Highways for the State of Pennsylvania,
the Secretary of Transportation of the United States, and the contractors who had been
awarded the construction contract for the project. Id.
77 315 F. Supp. 238, 248, 1 E.R. 1271, 1279 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
78
 231 U.S. 190 (1913).
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tion must be considered as addressed to the future, not to the past, . . .
[and] a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute ... unless
such be the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the
manifest intention of the legislature.' '"°
The court in Bartlett also seemed to construe the language of
NEPA narrowly. It read the phrases "to use all practicable means
and resources" and "to the fullest extent possible" in sections 101 and
102 as indicating a lack of retroactive intent on the part of Congress."
This interpretation does not seem warranted by the legislative his-
tory."
In Bartlett, the plaintiff cited the Texas Committee case for the
proposition that NEPA should be applied retroactively. This conten-
tion was rejected on two grounds; first, that the language referred to
by plaintiff was dictum and, second, that the cases were actually dis-
tinguishable. The court noted that in Texas Committee no construction
had yet begun, while it had in Bartlett. The court's consideration seems
limited to what the Department of Transportation was statutorily re-
quired to consider at the time the contract was awarded. Since this
was finalized prior to the passage of NEPA, it concluded that no viola-
tion of the Act occurred. This approach seems to ignore the complete
transaction. No federal money had yet been paid and construction
had only just begun. Thus, the court easily could have applied the
dictates of .NEPA to the remainder of the construction, thereby
achieving a harmonization of the two federal programs without nec-
essarily defeating the purposes of either. This harmonization was
favorably received in Texas Committee.
The case of Zabel v. Tabb82 would seem, at first glance, to indi-
cate that the prospects for applying NEPA retroactively are signifi-
cant. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held proper the decision of the
Army Corps of Engineers to deny a license for a wetlands fill project
on the grounds that the project would have an adverse environmental
impact. In so holding, the court introduced the directives of NEPA
to support its conclusion that the Corps' denial on non-navigational
grounds was within its authority. Since the Corps first recommended
denial of the license in 1966, it would seem that the court had applied
NEPA retroactively:
Although this Congressional command was not in existence
at the time the permit in question was denied, the correctness
of that decision must be determined by the applicable stan-
78 Id. at 199.
80 1 E.R. at 1279.
81 See pp. 544-50 supra.
82 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971).
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dards of today. (Emphasis added.) The national policy is set
forth in plain terms in § 101 and the disclaimer of § 104(3)
neither affects it nor the duty of all departments to consider,
consult, collaborate and conclude. For we hold that while it is
still the action of the Secretary of the Army on the recom-
mendation of the Chief of Engineers, the Army must consult
with, consider and receive, and then evaluate the recommenda-
tions of all of these other agencies particularly on all these
environmental factors .... Rather in weighing the application,
the Secretary of the Army is acting under a Congressional
mandate to collaborate and consider all of these factors."
While the position of the court on the question of retroactivity is
clear, the existence of alternative grounds for its holding makes the
real basis for the decision doubtful."
F. Summary
As indicated, sections 102 (1) and (2) are designed to operate
within the policy objectives set forth in sections 2 and 101. Read
together as an integrated pattern (as indeed they must be read since
they are but individual sections of a single statute) these several
provisions impose on all federal agencies and officials the responsibility
to take into account the environmental impact of their activity, and
to implement the national environmental policy "to the fullest extent
possible."
The provisions of Sections 102, 103, 104 and 105, and particularly
the modifying language "to the fullest extent possible" contained in
Section 102, make it clear that the National Environmental Policy Act
is intended to "supplement" rather than "modify or repeal" the exist-
ing statutory authority of federal agencies. Yet, at the same time, it
is clear that the National Environmental Policy Act is intended to
require federal agencies and officials to follow its policies, goals and
procedures unless their existing statutory authorizations clearly pro-
hibit full compliance with the Act's directives. When this conflict
occurs, section 103 then becomes operative. Under this section re-
ports have already been made to the President recommending legisla-
tive changes which are needed to harmonize the competing policy
objectives.
8a Id. at 213.
84 The court also held that (1) under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16
U.S.C. 66 et seq. (Sapp. IV, 1969), Congress intended that the Chief of Engineers
and the Secretary of the Army consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service before Issuing
a permit for a private dredge and fill operation, and (2) that the correctness of the
decision on the permit would be determined by standards of the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act.
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It is not yet clear the extent to which subsequent case law will
implement the policy goals of the Act. The Supreme Court has not
had occasion to consider any of these questions arising under NEPA,
and, consequently, they remain open issues. Indeed, there is little
judicial indication as to the meaning of the Act because only a short
time has elapsed since its passage, and because of the problem which
has arisen as to its retrospective application. From the few cases dis-
cussed here, it is apparent that only after extensive litigation and ju-
dicial decisions will the meaning of the disputed section of NEPA, its
standing requirements, and its relationship to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act and other federal statutes be resolved.
III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT OF 1970
Another important provision with respect to the environment is
included in the Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
which was approved on April 3, 1970. The Act begins with a statement
of Congressional Findings in Section 202 (a), which are:
(1) that man has caused changes in the environment;
(2) that many of these changes may affect the relationship
between man and his environment; and
(3) that population increases and urban concentration con-
tribute directly to pollution and degradation of our environ-
ment.
The Act then states in Section 202(b) (1) that "the Congress declares
that there is a national policy for the environment which provides for
the enhancement of the environmental quality," and further provides
in Section 202(b) (2) that "Mlle primary responsibility for imple-
menting this policy rests with State and local governments." Sec-
tion 202(c) states that the purposes of the Act are twofold: first, "to
assure that each Federal department and agency conducting or sup-
porting public works activities which affect the environment shall
implement the policies established under existing laws"; and second,
to establish an Office of Environmental Quality which shall provide
professional and administrative staff for the Council on Environmental
Quality established by the National Environmental Policy Act. The
relationship between these two agencies is explained below. Addition-
ally, the Act serves to underscore the critical importance of state and
local activity in the fight to restore and maintain environmental qual-
ity. By its own language, the Act recognizes the futility of inaction
by these political institutions while hopefully awaiting federal restora-
tion of the environment. In the final analysis, Congress has properly
deemed that state and local governments must act.
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IV. REORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
Since the present administration took office on January 20, 1969,
it has reorganized the federal bureaucracy with respect to environ-
mental pollution. The first organizational step taken by the President
was the establishment of the now defunct "Cabinet Committee on
the Environment,"85 by Executive Order No. 11472 on May 29, 1969.
The Cabinet Committee was chaired by the President and consisted
of the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD), Interior, and Transportation. Its functions were to
promote the preservation of the environment, to be aware of the
effects of federal programs on the environment, and to coordinate
governmental programs concerning the environment.
At best, the Cabinet Committee on the Environment was a stop-
gap measure which did not produce any significant results. The in-
ability of the Cabinet Committee to achieve or enhance environmental
quality was predictable. Cabinet committees often prove ineffective
for several reasons. The Secretary's time is already overburdened
with the administration of his own department. Moreover, the Sec-
retaries usually hesitate to criticize the work of the other departments.
Another more important reason, however, is that the Cabinet Com-
mittee on the Environment was not an adequate method by which to
resolve the conflicts of interests existing within the individual depart-
ments. For example, the Department of Agriculture has traditionally
been responsible for the inherently contradictory tasks of promoting
agriculture, on the one hand, and of controlling pesticides and herbi-
cides, on the other. Similarly, the Atomic Energy Commission was
charged with the conflicting duties of promoting the peaceful uses of
nuclear power and, at the same time, of protecting the environment
against the hazards of radioactive pollution. The Cabinet Committee
could not cope with problems of this type. The history of intra-cabinet
disputes has been one of jealous guarding of jurisdiction and respon-
sibility in order to insure continued political importance and ex-
pansion. A firmer organizational commitment to the preservation and
renovation of the environment was necessary to rectify these conflicts
and their resultant inadequacy within the structure of the Cabinet
Committee on the Environment.
The first major commitment of this kind was made by Congress
with the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
As previously noted, the Act required all federal agencies to notify the
President of measures deemed necessary to bring their jurisdiction
85 34 Fed. Reg. 8693 (1969), as amended by Exec. Order No, 11514, 35 Fed, Reg.
4247 (1970).
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and program operations into conformity with the stated policies of
the Act. It also established, within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, the Council on Environmental Quality, a full-time three-member
group charged with the responsibility of advising the President on
environmental affairs. The Council on Environmental Quality is similar
in form to the Council of Economic Advisors, and it was expected that
it would achieve similar importance.
The subsequently enacted Environmental Quality Improvement
Act of 1970 enhanced the effectiveness of the Council by establishing
the Office of Environmental Quality within the Executive Office of
the President. The Office of Environmental Quality is the extension
of the Council on Environmental Quality (the same person heads
both bodies), and, as noted, provides professional and administrative
staff in support of the Council.
These two innovations, the Council and the Office of Environ-
mental Quality, made the Cabinet Committee on the Environment
superfluous, and its existence was terminated on July 1, 1970 by
Executive Order No. 11541. 88 The new environmental agencies should
prove more effective than the Cabinet Committee because their status
as separate entities with full-time operations and personnel places
them in a better position to criticize the activities and programs of
the various departments of the government.
The remaining implementation of the declared national policies
of NEPA was effectuated by a restructuring of the numerous federal
agencies, departments and bureaus in order to parallel their organi-
zation with that of the single entity responsible for environmental
affairs. This rearrangement was effected by the President in Reor-
ganization Plans No. 3 87 and No. 488 which were issued on July 9,
1970, and became effective in September, 1970.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 created a "super-agency" known as
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Many scattered bureaus
and administrations were transferred from the Departments of the
Interior, HEW, Agriculture, and elsewhere to the newly created EPA.
This restructuring eliminated many of the old conflicts of interests.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 does not define the relationship of the
Executive Office with the EPA and the Council on Environmental
Quality. The Council and the EPA are, however, separate, and the
Administrator of the EPA is directly responsible only to the President.
Moreover, the EPA is of such importance that it was established as
an independent body rather than as a department of an existing
88
 35 Fed. Reg. 5844 (1970).
87 71 Environ. Rep. 0211 (Fed. Laws 1970).
88 71 Environ. Rep. 0221 (Fed. Laws 1970).
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agency, and it has been given authority over federal environmental
programs. The Council, on the other hand, serves mainly to advise
the President rather than to exercise power over federal agencies whose
programs affect the environment. It does exercise considerable power,
however, by establishing guidelines for federal action and has already
required one agency to prepare a detailed environmental impact state-
ment when the agency failed to do so of its own accord."
Reorganization Plan No. 4 established the National Oceano-
graphic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the Depart-
ment of Commerce. This agency is also a consolidation of various
activities previously handled by many bureaus of the several depart-
ments on a non-coordinated basis.
The difference between the two newly created bodies is that the
EPA is geared to respond quickly to common environmental threats
(inland water pollution, radiation hazards, air pollution, etc.), while
the NOAA is responsible for long-range planning in the preservation
of the ocean and the atmosphere.
Finally, at the close of the year, the Attorney General announced
the creation of a new unit within the Department of Justice to
strengthen enforcement of federal antipollution programs. The newly
established Pollution Control Section is part of the Department's
Division of Land and Natural Resources. It will be responsible for
pursuing all litigation previously handled by the Lands Division and
other sections within the Department of Justice, and will handle
matters referred to it by the Environmental Protection Agency and
other departments of the federal government.
V. CONCLUSION
The above discussion illustrates that considerable administrative
changes have taken place. Some were accomplished by Congress in
refocusing national priorities. Others were effected by the executive
branch both to avoid the conflicting responsibilities of government
agencies and to centralize control over antipollution programs. While
it is clear that these undertakings represent a significant step at the
federal level in the newly instituted struggle to restore and maintain
environmental quality, only the passage of time will indicate their
degree of effectiveness. There is some question whether administrative
changes alone can be effective.
As distinguished an environmentalist as Professor Joseph L. Sax
has stated his belief that environmental change cannot be accomplished
through administrative processes:
89
 Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 1 E.L.R. 50035, 50046 (1971).
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[TJhe administrative process tends to produce not the voice
of the people, but the voice of the bureaucrat—the adminis-
trative perspective posing as the public interest. Simply put,
the fact is that the citizen does not need a bureaucratic
middleman to identify, prosecute, and vindicate his interest
in environmental quality. He is perfectly capable of fighting
his own battles—if only he is given the tools with which to
do the job. And ... battles are best fought out between those
who have direct stakes in the outcome."
Professor Sax argues that the bureaucratic middleman does not have
the necessary direct stake in the outcome to fight the best battle, and
all too often reflects the view of businessmen in the industry he is
charged to regulate. Speaking to the several suggestions that the re-
form movement include within agency practice the voice of "inde-
pendent councils of experts, ombudsmen, negotiators, and so on,"
Professor Sax finds them insufficient: "They only rearrange, or re-
name, the insider perspective which is at the root of the problem.
They fail because they do not change the balance of power—precisely
what the development of a scheme of enforceable legal rights, backed
by judicial power, can do."°1 Professor Sax's central thesis is that
there is a "need to reassert citizen initiative in the management of our
environment,"" and this can be accomplished only by giving the
citizen access to the courtroom, which Professor Sax argues, "is an
eminently suitable forum for the voicing of citizen concerns over the
maintenance of environmental quality.""
This approach certainly differs from the approach of the adminis-
tration and the main focus of the congressional concern as expressed
in NEPA. Nevertheless, the few cases arising under that statute
demonstrate that its provisions may support citizen participation in
governmental decision making through the judicial process. Which-
ever position is right—that of the regulators for administrative reform
or that of Professor Sax for increased citizen litigation—the language
contained in NEPA, could arguably serve as the foundation for each.
00 J. Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizens Action 56 (1971).
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 Id. at 83.
92 Id. at XVII.
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 Id. at 57.
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